use, as when we say that a horse is 'ornamented with a phalerae' or 'saddled' or 'armed'. 2 Aquinas holds that habitus belong primarily to humans, and to other beings only through human rational causal activity. But most Scholastic thinkers, including many Thomists, denied that habitus has a special connection to human persons. In this article, I inquire into why Aquinas held this thesis about habitus, and I defend the interpretation of John of St. Thomas and many Thomists after him as the view that best makes sense of this thesis in the context of all of Aquinas's texts. This view, the realist modal view, holds that first, habitus are real modes and real beings, not mere predications, and second, habitus belong primarily to humans, through their application of artifacts to themselves such that their unlimited range of possible ways of rationally engaging with the world is actualized by the artifacts. 3 The findings of this paper are important for understanding the Thomistic view of the human person.
The importance of habitus and of the realist modal view can only fully be understood in the context of an inquiry into the history of Scholastic views on habitus. This inquiry will reveal the complexity of Scholastic views on categories and accidents, not only on habitus, but on the members of the other "sex principia" (actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, and habitus). The findings of this paper are important for understanding the categories and accidents in general. I first analyze the sources for Scholastic thinking on habitus. Second, I consider seven Scholastic theories of what habitus is and argue that they are all reducible either to the view that habitus are extrinsic denominations or to the realist modal view. Finally, I defend the latter view.
I. SOURCES FOR SCHOLASTIC THEORIES OF HABITUS
Scholastic theories of habitus are based on three passages from Aristotle's Categories, two from Metaphysics, and one from Parts of Animals. In this section, I analyze these texts and the early commentaries on them that influenced Scholastic thinkers.
In Categories 4.2a3, Aristotle mentions habitus (or habere; in Greek, echein) in his list of the categories, and gives "being shod" and "being armed" (hupodedetai, hōplistai) as examples. 4 This text gave rise to Scholastic controversies over whether the categories are kinds of predicates, predications, real things, or predicates mirroring distinctions among real things. This controversy was transmitted to Scholastic thinkers through Boethius, 5 who held that a habitus is not a being inhering in a subject, but a relative manner of having something extrinsic. 6 In Categories 9.11b13, Aristotle lists six categories (actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habitus) that he does not discuss in detail. These sex principia were treated at length in the twelfthcentury Liber sex principiis (or Liber sex principiorum), which was subsequently included in editions of Aristotle's Organon and commented on in that context. The Liber holds that what is distinctive about the sex principia is that they are forms that 4 Sometimes this category is referred to by a noun, 'habitus' or 'hexis'; sometimes by an infinitive, 'habere' or 'echein'. I shall generally give only Latin, rather than Greek or Arabic, technical terms, since I am focusing on Scholastic theories. 6 Boethius, In Categ., s. 7 (Migne, ed., 64:217A, 219A-C, 221A-B); s. 9 (Migne, ed., 64:264A).
belong to a composite 7 and are neither subsistent (as are substantial forms) nor intrinsic (as are qualitative and quantitative forms) but extrinsic, referring to something outside the subject. 8 The Liber does not define what is meant by 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic', but Scholastic thinkers generally understood the distinction as follows. A form is intrinsic to a subject if and only if it immediately depends just on the subject; for example, having a certain mass is intrinsic since it depends just on the subject that has the mass. A form is extrinsic to a subject if and only if it immediately depends on both the subject and something other than the subject; for example, being punched is extrinsic, since it depends on the one who is punched and the one who punches. Scholastic thinkers debated whether extrinsic accidents are real forms or mere extrinsic denominations, and whether they involve any intrinsic change to the subject. According to the Liber, since habitus comes to be through a change in position of artifacts relative to the body of which it is predicated, it is extrinsic. 9 According to the Liber, habitus is "of a body and of those things adjacent around a body" but is had by just part of the body, for example, as a shoe is had by the foot. What is proper (proprium) to habitus is that it exists in multiple subjects, the thing that has and the thing that is had, for example, in both a foot and a shoe. Some accidents in other categories are also dual-subject accidents, such as the relation of similarity, but it is distinctive of habitus that every member of the category is a dual-subject accident. 10 While the definition of habitus from the Liber was adopted by all subsequent Scholastic thinkers, this dual-subject view was adopted only by Albert, but then not mentioned by later Scholastic thinkers, including Aquinas, all of whom rejected the possibility of dual-subject accidents.
11
I consider this dual-subject view below.
In Categories 15.15b21, Aristotle gives a list of eight ways in which the infinitive 'to have' (habere, echein) is said; this text raises the question of which kinds of having belong to the category habitus. 'To have' or 'having' is a "post-predicament," like 'motion' and 'prior and posterior', that is, it is a predicate said with multiple senses, each of which fits into a different category. Aristotle does not explicitly match each mode of having to a particular category, so there was debate among Scholastic thinkers over which category fits with each mode of having. One can have a coat, in the sense of wearing it (Aristotle's third mode of having); this 'having', along with the fourth mode (wearing items like rings that cover a small part of the body), fits into the category of habitus. One can also have a coat in the sense of owning it (the seventh mode of having), and this, on most Scholastic views, fits into the category of relation.
12 Scholastic thinkers debated whether the fifth mode, by which a substance has its parts, belongs to habitus, as Averroës, for example, held. Some also suggested that the seventh mode and eighth mode (by which spouses have each other) belong to habitus; they held that habitus is constituted whenever a person chooses to have or to use a thing extrinsic to him or herself.
In Metaphysics 5.20.1022b3-10, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of habitus, which do not correspond to the modes of habere listed in the previous text. The first mode in this text is a sort of "activity" or "medium" had between one who wears clothes and the clothes; this was often taken by Scholastic thinkers to be a quasi-definition of habitus.
14 Aristotle likens wearing clothes to making something: just as there is an activity of making between a maker and a made thing, so there is a medium of having between a wearer and his clothes. This having is not itself had by the subject, since then the having of the having would be had, leading to an infinite series of havings.
As a quasi-activity, that is, as something like an activity, habitus is similar to the members of the categories of actio and passio. Actio is the category of predicates that ascribe an act of efficient causality to a subject, and passio is the category of predicates that ascribe an instance of being affected by an efficient cause to a subject. But Simplicius of Cilicia argues that it does not follow that habitus is reducible to the category actio.
15 Habitus is not a category just because of the action involved but also because of the way in which one body is accompanied or surrounded (circumcingi, circumponuntur) by another, whereby one being is ordered (habitudine) to another. Nor should there be a second category, haberi, opposed to habere, as passio is opposed to actio, since whenever a habitus predicate is used, both the "having" and the "being had" are cosignified. 16 This anticipates the dual-subject view, in that Simplicius holds that habitus includes two converse orderings, apparently rooted in two subjects.
In Metaphysics 5.23.1023a7-23, Aristotle distinguishes four modes of 'to have' (habere, echein), which do not match the lists in the last two texts. The first mode is having a thing through a 14 Categories cannot have real definitions, because they are the most general genera and definitions are composed of a higher genus and a specific difference, but they can be precisely described or have "quasi-definitions." 15 Simplicius calls actio 'facere' and habitus 'habere' in Moerbeke's translation. 16 natural tendency or impulse, as a fever has a person, a tyrant has a city, and people have the clothes they are wearing. 17 These examples suggest that this mode includes members of the category habitus, but perhaps also members of other categories. In this mode, the subject has something not just through spatial adjacency but also through a natural tendency to acquire this sort of extrinsic thing. The twentieth-century Thomist J. Valbuena takes this mode to constitute the category of habitus and so includes the first two examples in habitus. 18 Aristotle's text on this mode of having seems to be a remote basis for Aquinas's thesis that habitus properly belong only to humans (no source for his thesis is in fact stated). The account of this mode of having is developed by Simplicius, following the Neo-Platonist Iamblichus, and by the Muslim philosopher Algazel, both of whom were known to Aquinas. 19 Simplicius holds that habitus belongs only to living beings. The case of one body being surrounded by another, as when a statue is clothed, just involves an accident in the category of passio. But habitus is constituted by a living creature working to support (insinuat tensionem) a body that is adjacent to itself, that is not natural to it, and that it uses and acquires. 20 Though he does not fully explain why this constitutes a new category, it seems to be because the living creature and the accompanying body, in virtue of the former's use and support of the latter, are oriented toward a new purpose. This orientation is explained by a new kind of accident. This view is developed by Albert, who holds that habitus fulfills a purpose, such as clothing for warmth, or weapons for attack or defense. 21 While Albert, unlike Aquinas, does not explicitly restrict habitus to being the result of rational use, rather than of natural impulse, his examples tend in this direction. Habitus arises, in all his examples, when a person acquires an extrinsic thing that fulfills some need, and applies it to his body such that it conforms to the shape and position of the body. 22 The acquired body, an artifact or a domesticated animal, is the material cause of habitus, and the human body is its final cause. 23 The form of habitus inheres in both, though it is said only of the subject that has the extrinsic thing. Habitus actualizes a potency in a subject, allowing a new action or making an action easier, such as fighting or ornamenting oneself, 24 though Albert, like Aquinas after him, does not explain how this comes about. Habitus, like the other sex principia, has a relation of surrounding or accompanying (circumdationem) as its foundation, that is, as a necessary condition to which it adds the differences mentioned here. 25 On this dual-subject view, what makes it true that "a man is clothed" is the man, the clothes, the relation of the clothes to the man, and a habitus inhering in both. On all the Scholastic views, the category habitus differs in some way from the category "relation" (or ad aliquid). As Albert puts it, with most Scholastic thinkers in agreement, relations are comparisons (comparibilitas) of the subject to some extrinsic thing in some respect.
26 Habitus (and the other sex principia) adds something, such as a causal connection, to this comparison.
This dual-subject view, however, is problematic. First, the causal structure of habitus on this view is confused. Habitus inheres in both subjects, but chiefly in the man, not the clothes, since it is said of and affects the man, not the clothes. Yet its 22 material cause is said to be the clothes, not the potency it actualizes in the man. But the material cause of a being is its principle of potentiality, and so, on this account, it ought to actualize something in the clothes, not in the man, but this is not the case. Second, habitus cannot be individuated by its subject, as accidents are on some Scholastic views such as that of Aquinas, 27 so habitus is not clearly an individual form, at least from some Scholastic perspectives. Third, it is not clear how habitus has per se unity on this view, which every categorical being must have, since it is intrinsically dependent on multiple subjects. Fourth, it does not clearly match the structure of habitus predications, which ascribe a property just to the thing that has, not to the thing that is had; this will be concerning to those who hold that the correct ontology must match the structure of ordinary language. None of these concerns absolutely defeat this view, but they raise problems that other views overcome.
On the basis of some of Simplicius's and Albert's claims, Aquinas's restriction of habitus to humans makes sense, though Aquinas rejects the dual-subject view. The new kind of being of habitus arises, on Aquinas's view, not just through active using, which could be explained through actions and relations, but through the intentionality and purpose exerted in the using, by which the artifact actualizes one of the open-ended range of potentialities for engaging with the world engendered by human reason. This account is perhaps rooted, as the seventeenthcentury Jesuit Antonio Rubio contends, in another text of Aristotle, Parts of Animals 4.10. This Aristotelian text explains how nonhuman animals have been given only one means of defense and covering each, but humans have intelligence, and organs adapted to intelligence such as hands, whereby we can invent any covering or instrument we like; thus, it is necessary that by nature we be naked and without tools, that we might be able to develop any sort of tool for our purposes. 28 This defense of the realist modal view will be expanded in the final section of the paper, but here we can see its roots in Aristotle's texts and the subsequent tradition.
Aristotle's first mode of having in this last text from the Metaphysics is also developed by Algazel. Algazel argues that in order to constitute a new category, habitus must not only involve one body being surrounded (comprehendendi) by or adjacent to another, but also the surrounding body must be moved with the motion of the surrounded body, as when the clothes one is wearing move along with one. If something that can constitute a member of the category of habitus, such as a tunic, is moving but not surrounding a body, as when one is putting the tunic on, then no habitus is constituted; if an artifact surrounds a body, but does not move with that body, as when a house surrounds a person, then no habitus is constituted.
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To sum up, the Aristotelian texts transmitted to the Scholastic tradition the notion of a category that is typified by examples like wearing clothes and holding weapons but that could involve other sorts of havings. To be an accident in the category habitus is to be a medium between a subject that has and something that is had. adveniens view, and the realist modal view. 30 Various Thomists held each of these views and ascribed each to Aquinas. I maintain that his view is best expressed by the realist modal view, which holds that habitus are real modes, that is, beings really distinct from their subjects that cannot exist apart from their subjects. Moreover, I maintain that each of these views reduces to being a form of either the extrinsic denomination view or the realist modal view. I present the views in the order that I do, because this order best shows the full historical context for the realist modal view and the history of Scholastic views not only on habitus, but also on the sex principia in general.
II. SCHOLASTIC THEORIES OF HABITUS

A) The Intentional Modal View
The thirteenth-century thinker Henry of Ghent held that habitus and the other sex principia are "modes" that do not exist in themselves, but are "intentionally" distinct from their subjects. This view has precedents in Boethius and Aristotle, 31 especially in the first text cited from the Metaphysics, which held that habitus is a 'medium', a term often equated by Scholastic thinkers with the term 'mode'. A version of this view was held by some in the twelfth century, including Gilbert of Poitiers. 32 On this view, what makes it true that "a man is clothed" are the man, his clothes, and a mode of having whereby the man has his clothes, which is intentionally distinct 30 from, but really identical to, the man. This view posits "modes" that are neither really nor rationally distinct from their subjects but are only intentionally distinct-that is, distinct ways in which a thing can be conceptualized, founded in the way reality actually is, without involving a real distinction of beings or things. The distinction between a subject and its mode is not a distinction of reason but an intentional distinction founded in reality, midway between a real and a rational distinction. Claims regarding this sort of distinction tell us something about the way reality actually is, not just about how it appears to us, but in making such claims we do not posit a separate entity to account for those features of reality. The mode of habitus is really identical to, but intentionally distinct from, its foundation in the man.
Henry argues that the ten categories are ten rationes, modi essendi, or ways of thinking about a being. They do not all correspond to really distinct kinds of beings; not every categorical mode or ratio corresponds to a separate res or real thing. (This is unlike the realist modal view, as we shall see.)
The sex principia reduce in reality to relations, and relations to their foundations in the three categories whose members are res: substance, quality, and quantity. 33 But all of the categories are intentionally distinct. Whereas relations are directly founded on substance, quality, or quantity, the sex principia are also founded on motion or dispositions to motion, since motions bring two things together, such as a thing and a place.
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Relation and the sex principia are ways in which a res is with respect to another, or ways that refer their subject to another. They are their foundation plus a "mode," a ratio of the thing in reference to another, which does not exist separately in itself. 36 One might object that this formulation does not entail that modes do not really exist but only that they cannot exist separated from their subjects. But Henry makes it clear that modes do not really add anything to their subjects; for example, he holds that God has modes added to him without threat to his simplicity because they are not really distinct from him. Habitus, on this view, is a contained thing, such as a person, considered with respect to what contains it, such as clothes, resulting from the motion of receiving that container.
37
Some Thomists, such as John of St. Thomas, call habitus a mode but mean that it is a kind of real being, while other Thomists, such as John Capreolus, deny that habitus is a mode but draw on Henry's account of habitus as a "respectus."
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Terms like 'mode' and 'respectus' shifted in meaning among Scholastic thinkers, which in part led to the proliferation of views on the sex principia. In contemporary literature, Robert Pasnau takes Aquinas's view to be similar to Henry's. Aquinas calls the categories "modes of being" (modi essendi) and he seems to hold that some of the categories are really identical to one another, only distinct inasmuch as we distinguish them in order to understand reality, and insofar as our terms for these modes denominate different "structures" of reality, to use Pasnau's term. 39 This notion of "structure" helps make sense of the idea that these modes could be founded in reality without introducing real differences: reality has aspects that involve differences without involving the introduction of entirely new, irreducible beings. For example, actio and passio are really both the motion brought about by an efficient cause in a patient, but they are distinguished conceptually and denominatively insofar as that effect can be referred in different ways to the agent and to the patient, in a way similar to Henry's intentional distinction. 40 Even more explicitly, Aquinas states that that from which something is denominated is not necessarily always a form according to the nature of the thing, but it suffices that it be signified through the mode of a form, grammatically speaking. Indeed, a human being is denominated from action, clothing, and other things of that sort, which really are not forms.
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This suggests that, on Aquinas's view, habitus, actio, and probably the other sex principia are not really distinct from their subjects, but just involve talking about subjects as if they had forms of these kinds. For example, clothes act like a form for the human body, which is picked out by habitus predications, but they are not really forms. Indeed, Aquinas says elsewhere that habitus (and ubi, quando, and situs) are effects of relations of the subject having to the thing had. 42 On some interpretations, the members of these categories are even reducible to members of the category 'relation'. 43 Ultimately, however, Henry's view reduces to other views. On the one hand, this view could be interpreted in such a way that it reduces to the extrinsic denomination view, as it was interpreted by the sixteenth-century Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca, and by the seventeenth-century Jesuit Richard Lynch. On this interpretation, intentionally distinct modes are really identical to their subjects and so are mere ways of denominating those subjects based on extrinsic things, though these extrinsic things can be thought of as affecting their subjects. 45 of some subject with reference to an extrinsic thing that can be considered grammatically as a form of the subject. 46 Henry too seems to think of them as ways of talking about a subject with respect to things extrinsic to it. The intentional modal view would then have the same problems that we shall see that the extrinsic denomination view has. On the other hand, one could interpret "mode" in a more robust manner, holding that if modes are distinct aspects of reality, then they are real beings; on this interpretation, the intentional modal view would reduce to the realist modal view, which I shall defend below. On this view, habitus is a predication of a participle of some subject, where the participle denominates the subject as connoting an extrinsic adjacent body. When I say "a man is clothed," a passive participle is predicated of 'man', whereby a man is considered as connoting, or having to do with, clothes. The things that make the claim true are an individual man and his individual clothes, in a certain situation with respect to one another. There is no need to posit any other being; the "situation," the "respect," and the "connoting" are not real beings or forms but are only considered linguistically as if they were. 48 Suárez holds that there are three kinds of categorical accidents, all of which are oriented towards substances as their subjects: intrinsic accidents, modes, and extrinsic denominations. 49 An accident is an intrinsic accident if and only if it (1) has its own proper entity separate from its subject 50 and (2) (5) really changes that in which it inheres if it inheres. 54 For example, quantities like intelligible mathematical surfaces and qualities like heat are intrinsic accidents. 55 No Scholastic thinker held that habitus is an intrinsic accident, because there is no way that "being dressed" could be preserved apart from its subject, so it does not meet (3).
B) The Extrinsic Denomination View
An accident is a mode on Suárez's view if and only if it (1) does not have its own proper entity distinct from others, 56 (2) is intrinsically apt to exist in another and (3) can only actually exist in another, 57 and so (4) cannot exist actually on its own even by divine power, (5) only has its nature in its inhering, 58 and (6) really changes that in which it inheres. 59 For example, the sensible shape of some portion of extended space is a mode in the category of quality, which cannot exist apart from its subject.
60 A mode, on Suárez's view, is not a full "thing" (res) capable of existing or being understood apart from its subject, but it is also not merely rationally or intentionally distinct from its subject. It genuinely affects its subject, adding to it a completion or perfection beyond those provided by its essence. 61 Suárez's modes have more being than Henry's, because of (1) and (5); at least, this is how they were understood by, for example, John of St. Thomas. But John denies that modes fulfill conditions (1) and (5): on John's view, modes are really and fully beings.
62 On Suárez's view, essence and existence are really identical and there can be beings without proper entity, if such beings have their existence only in another and so do not have independent essence. 63 On John's view, essence and existence are really distinct, and existence gives ultimate completion to a being, such that there cannot be beings without proper entity: everything that has existence is properly a being, with its own real essence. 64 An accident is a categorical extrinsic denomination if and only if it is (1) a predicate that denominates some subject by reference to something extrinsic to that subject, where (2) that extrinsic thing acts as a sort of form toward the subject such that the subject seems to be modified by the extrinsic thing's formal activity, 65 but (3) the extrinsic thing does not inhere in the denominated subject, 66 though the subject is (4) spoken of in the extrinsic denomination as if modified and as if resulting in a concrete accidental unity with the extrinsic thing, 67 and (5) has a certain ordering to the extrinsic thing but (6) is not really changed beyond having a real relation of ordering to the extrinsic thing.
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But there are two kinds of extrinsic denominations, those that are categorical, and those that are beings of reason (an example of which is "being seen"). The former involve the extrinsic thing acting as a sort of form of the subject and causing a real categorical relation toward itself in the subject, but the latter do not involve any such affecting or 63 70 For example, clothes, by being near a body, act as a sort of form of the body whereby the body is ornamented. 71 In accord with Aristotle's Metaphysics 5.20.1022b3-10, the subject has its clothes, and this having, though not a real being, is a sort of medium from the man to the clothes, though not vice versa. 72 But there is nothing really existing here besides the body, the clothes, the real relations of nearness or contact of the man to the clothes and vice versa, the place or boundary surface (ubi) of both that founds those relations, and the internal arrangement of parts (situs) of both; no new kind of per se unity and being is introduced. 73 Suárez holds that the view that habitus is a real mode is unthinkable. 74 The Conimbricenses similarly contend that there is no intrinsic difference between being dressed and being naked, and so no real mode of habitus needs to be posited. 75 Arriaga argues that it is as improbable to think that getting dressed brings about a real change in the dressed body as it is to think that the coming into being of a new white thing in India brings about a new real relation of similarity to that white thing in every white thing in the world. However, he admits this is somewhat unconvincing, as getting dressed seems to produce a greater change in me than does the production of something new in India. 76 Suárez argues for the lack of real change by contending that God could annihilate the body or the clothes and preserve the other exactly as it was, and so no mode needs to be posited to explain being dressed. 77 But this begs the question as to whether getting dressed brings about a real change in either, since it assumes that were God to annihilate one of these subjects, the other would remain exactly the way it was.
In my view, the most problematic aspect of this view is that it denies or fails to account for a unique connection between human persons and artifacts; the reasons why such an account must be given will be presented below. This is contrary to the tendency to pay close attention to experience and "save the appearances" in a nonreductionistic manner that is a hallmark of much Aristotelian thought. Wearing clothes and using tools make a difference to the way in which we engage with the world, over and above the spatial relations we have to those artifacts, but the view we are investigating here explains this experience reductionistically. Just as Aristotelianism gives a nonreductionist metaphysics of intentionality, by positing entities such as intentional species, so the unique features of the experience of engaging with the world through artifacts likewise suggests the need for positing a new entity. Likewise, this theory severs some of the isomorphism between language and reality typical of Aristotelianism, an isomorphism that grounds much of the realism of that philosophy: habitus predications in ordinary language seem to posit a unique sort of property had by a subject; if this is the case, then the metaphysics should match. A philosopher with antireductionist and realist intuitions has good reasons to reject the extrinsic denomination view. 
C) The Absolute Entity with "Respectus" View
John of St. Thomas and the Scotists Bartholomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Belluto mention that some held that the predicates in these categories signify something absolute (that is, intrinsic and nonrelational) with a respectus or ordering to the denominated subject. John does not mention any names of those who held this view; Mastrius and Belluto wrongly attribute it to Rubio, who actually holds the realist modal view.
78 By contrast with the last two views, according to which the predicate signifies the denominated subject with an ordering to the extrinsic thing, on this view, the predicate signifies the extrinsic thing with an ordering to the denominated subject. The predicate 'clothed' in "a man is clothed" would refer to the clothes insofar as they are ordered to the man wearing them. What makes the sentence true are the man, his clothes, and perhaps a relation from the clothes to the man or an intentionally distinct mode in the clothes. There is little difference between this view and the former two views: on none of these views is habitus a kind of real being. Indeed, Suárez sometimes speaks as if he held this view: he says that the realities abstractly referred to by habitus predicates are the clothes. 79 Arriaga and Hurtado say that habitus predicates refer to the clothes as placed around (ubicationibus) the man.
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A member of the Thomistic tradition who may have held this view is the sixteenth-century Jesuit Francisco Toletus, who held that habitus predications are taken from a form or thing, which by some mode is around a body and which ornaments or 78 clothes the body. 81 Since he held that the sex principia are extrinsic denominations, "mode" here is understood in something like Henry's sense of the term. Toletus's version of this view is a version of the extrinsic denomination view. But, in addition to the problems with the latter, this view has the added disadvantage of not conforming to the semantic structure of habitus predications: habitus predications, such as "a man is clothed" attribute a form to the subject, the man, not to the extrinsic thing, the clothes, and this is not reflected on this view.
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D) The Pure "Respectus" View
John of St. Thomas lists two views that hold that the sex principia are respectus, a term from Henry that was also used in the last three views. One view holds that the sex principia are pure respectus, that is, orderings (habitudines) or comparisons (comparationes) of one thing to another that are free of anything absolute and do not include anything inhering in the subject but are just an ordering. When we say that "a man is clothed," we mean that the man has an ordering towards the clothes. This ordering, which, as on the intentional modal view, is not really distinct from the man, corresponds to the predicate 'clothed', and, together with the man and the clothes, and perhaps with members of the categories relation and ubi, makes this sentence true. The other respectus view, which will be considered next, is the view that the sex principia are respectus extrinsecus adveniens. The two views are similar in some ways, and some Scholastic thinkers, such as Mastrius and Belluto, held that they were the same. Capreolus holds that habitus is neither something absolute, that is, nonrelational, as on the realist modal view, nor something absolute together with an ordering (respectus) to another, as on the absolute entity with respectus view. 85 John of St. Thomas, perhaps noting the similarities between this view and Henry's, presents the pure respectus view as holding that the habitus is a mode in the subject that orders the subject toward an extrinsic thing. 86 But on Capreolus and Soncinas's version of this view, habitus is just a respectus, not a mode with a respectus. A respectus is just a way of predicating with a foundation in reality, not a kind of real being; thus this view resembles the intentional modal view. 87 The difference is that here the predicate denotes the pure ordering, not an intentionally distinct mode.
A prima facie objection to this view is that it seems to reduce habitus to the category of relation, which its proponents do not want to claim; my reply to this objection will introduce an important distinction. Categorical relations, Soncinas argues, immediately result from the existence of absolute things. For example, a relation of similarity immediately results from the existence of one white form (the foundation) and another white form (the term), both of which are absolute. But habitus (and the other sex principia) results immediately from the existence of its foundation and its term when these are in a relation of adjacency or containment, and so it is not reducible to relation, since it is founded, as Aquinas said, on a relation. Habitus is said to be left (derelinquitur) 88 in the contained subject, not as anything absolute or really distinct from the subject, but as a pure ordering of the subject towards something adjacent. Only a pure respectus can, Soncinas claims, be a medium between two things, as Aristotle says habitus is, since nothing absolute can exist between two things, contrary to the dual subject view. 89 Soncinas holds that any instance of being contained belongs to habitus. 90 Capreolus at one point claims, following Aquinas, that only humans have habitus, 91 and then he goes on, in what seems to be a self-contradiction, to cite approvingly a claim of Averroës that holds that an animal having skin is in this category. 92 Ultimately, despite its proponents' claims to the contrary, this view reduces to the extrinsic denomination view: a respectus is just an ordering of a subject to something extrinsic, said in virtue of or as resulting from that extrinsic thing, distinct from the subject only conceptually with a foundation in reality.
E) The "Respectus Extrinsecus Adveniens" View
The second view that holds that habitus is a kind of respectus holds that habitus (along with the other sex principia) are respectus that come to a thing from something extrinsic (respectus extrinsecus adveniens). This view was first formulated by John Duns Scotus, who held that members of these categories are real beings. On this view, what makes it true that "a man is clothed" are the man, the clothes, and a respectus that orders the man toward the clothes. At least one Thomist, the 88 'Derelinquere' and 'relinquere' denote that these accidents are "in" their subjects, and are not mere extrinsic denominations, but are not "intrinsic" in their subjects. 89 Dominican Thomas de Vio Cajetan, also held this view. But on his version of the view, the members of the sex principia are not really distinct forms but are merely ways of conceiving a being as if they were forms that follow upon the relation of adjacency. 93 While this is a realist view for Scotus, it is a version of the extrinsic denomination view for Cajetan. Later thinkers, such as da Fonseca, likewise took this to be a version of the extrinsic denomination view. 94 The proponents of this view distinguish two kinds of respectus: respectus intrisecus adveniens and respectus extrinsecus adveniens; this distinction distinguishes this view from the pure respectus view. A respectus is a respectus intrinsecus adveniens (and therefore in the category of relation) if and only if it arises immediately and necessarily in the subject of the foundation given the existence of the foundation and the term. For example, given any two white things, a respectus intrinsecus adveniens of similarity will arise in each thing. These respectus are intrinsic because they depend only on intrinsic substantial, qualitative, or quantitative forms. A respectus is a respectus extrinsecus adveniens (and therefore in one of the sex principia) if and only if it arises from its foundation and term just when these are in some proper relation; different kinds of these respectus are founded in different kinds of foundations, terms, and relations. For example, given the respectus intrinsecus adveniens of adjacency between a man and his clothes, a respectus extrinsecus adveniens of habitus arises ordering the man towards the clothes. In order to arise, some cause must put the man and the clothes into the right relation, as when he gets dressed. For a respectus intrinsecus, no causal activity beyond 93 that which brings about the foundation and term is required. 95 On the pure respectus view, by contrast, respectus like habitus do arise immediately given their relata: given the existence of a container and the contained, habitus arises. 96 But this apparent difference between the views really is just a matter of different descriptions under which the relata are taken. The respectus of habitus does not arise immediately from the existence of the man qua man and the clothes qua clothes. But it does immediately arise from the existence of the man qua contained and the clothes qua containing. The pure respectus view uses the latter description, while the respectus extrinsecus adveniens view uses the former. They agree that habitus arise from a foundation and a term in a relation of containment or adjacency. Yet it is not clear on either view why this relation would constitute a new category of being.
Scotus distinguishes between intrinsic forms, such as qualities and quantities, and respectus extrinsecus adveniens. This is a distinction much like that between intrinsic forms and modes on Suárez's view. Scotus calls respectus "modes," but he thinks that they really add to their subjects, are really distinct from their subjects, and have their own essence. 97 Intrinsic forms are capable of existing apart from their subjects, at least by divine power; respectus cannot, but must inhere immediately in their subjects. 98 Scotus does not discuss the sex principia in detail, 99 but if this account were applied to habitus, it would have, on my interpretation, the following analysis: when a person is dressed, a respectus extrinsecus adveniens of habitus comes to be, immediately inhering in the person, and ordering him or her toward the clothes. But, I contend, given this inherence in the subject, the habitus would not just be an ordering of the subject to another, as on the pure respectus view, but would be an absolute mode in the subject. Scotus's view anticipates the realist modal view, but later Scotists rejected that view, which holds that the sex principia are both absolute modes and transcendental relations. 100 I shall consider transcendental relations in the next section; briefly, they are relations that are identical to their subjects or foundations. Mastrius and Belluto argue that since respectus extrinsecus are orderings toward another thing, they are not absolute modes. Since they are essentially added to their subject, they are not transcendental relations. Since each respectus is one unified thing, they are not absolute modes plus a respectus or transcendental relation. They are not extrinsic denominations, because predications involving the sex principia attribute something real to the subject. Rather, they are just respectus, real orderings of a subject toward something extrinsic.
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One problem with the respectus extrinsecus adveniens view is that it holds that habitus, though resulting from extrinsic things, are ways in which subjects are ordered toward extrinsic things. But this is not what habitus primarily are; rather, as can be seen from the structure of a predication like "a man is clothed," and as will be further argued below, they are ways in which a subject is affected by an extrinsic thing. Indeed, Mastrius and Belluto allow that in the case of habitus there is a "mode of informing and sustaining" (modum informationis et sustentationis) from the clothes, from which a special union between the subject and the clothes results, irreducible to the members of any other category. However, they ridicule any attempt to derive this category from the human aptitude to use clothes, as Rubio and other proponents of the realist modal view do. 102 On their view, habitus is a unique sort of union between two things, without a clear reason why this results in a new category of being. This view thus seems, despite their denial, to be a version of the realist modal view. Ultimately, the realist modal and extrinsic denomination views are the only plausible views of habitus and the other sex principia.
F) The Realist Modal View
The view that I defend as both true and the view that best makes sense of Aquinas's thesis on habitus is the view that habitus is a real mode, that is, a real being that cannot exist except by inhering in its subject and that really changes its subject when it inheres in its subject. Although this view is terminologically similar to the intentional modal view, on the realist modal view, modes are really, not just intentionally, distinct from their subjects. Although this account of modes is similar to that of Suárez, it differs in that, on this view, modes are complete beings with complete essences and acts of existence, rather than, on Suárez's view, partial essences and existences. According to the realist modal view, what makes it true that "a man is clothed" are a man, his clothes, and a mode of habitus inhering in the man; the predicate 'clothed' denotes the mode.
This view is explicitly held by several seventeenth-century philosophers: Antonio Rubio; the Irish philosopher Bernardus Morisanus; the Complutenses, that is, the Carmelite commentators on Aristotle at the University of Alcalá; and the Dominican Thomists John of St. Thomas and Antonius Goudin; and it is also held by most subsequent Thomists. It has precursors in the work of Peter Abelard and the fourteenthcentury modist Radulphus Brito.
103 On Abelard's view, terms in the logical category of habitus refer to a kind of accidental thing (res) which comes to a subject from extrinsic things like weapons that one has, which is more long lasting than a passio, and which is a property of the thing that has, not of the thing had; Abelard excludes the dual-subject and absolute-entity-withrespectus views.
104 On Brito's view, a habitus accident (and each of the sex principia) is an absolute mode caused and left (derelinquitur) in a subject by something extrinsic, whereby the subject is compared to that extrinsic thing as contained to containing thing, and which, unlike on other versions of this view, is not founded on a relation. 105 John of St. Thomas, who best develops what subsequently became the standard Thomistic view, acknowledges that predicates in the logical category habitus, like those in all the sex principia, are expressed by extrinsic denomination, as Aquinas says. But, like Suárez, he distinguishes two kinds of extrinsic denominations. First, some are relations of reason like 'being seen'; in these, nothing changes in the denominated subject. Second, some are categorical; in these, the presence of the extrinsic thing from which the subject is denominated brings about a change in the subject. He explains this change by positing a mode or "respectus" in the subject. For example, wearing involves either a sort of action (and so change) of the subject, as in the display of ornamentation in wearing make-up, or a sort of passion (and so change) of the subject, as in being covered by clothes, that results from the extrinsic thing, and it involves a link between the person who has and the artifact that is had in a way different from other actions and passions.
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On John's view, there are two kinds of modes: those that are reductively in some nonmodal category and those that are in categories that just contain modes. 107 First, a mode is reductively in a nonmodal category if and only if it pertains to the constitution of a member of a category that is not itself a mode. For example, to be a complete substance, a substance must be incommunicable, unable to be part of or assumed by another substance; this is explained by a mode of subsistence, which is not a being with its own act of existence but a constitutive principle of complete substances. Second, a mode is in a category that just contains modes if and only if it is a mode that does not constitute a member of another category but is a being per se, with a complete nature and its own act of existence. These modes are not really separable from the extrinsic things from which they result but are "principles of fittingness" (principia convenientes) between a subject and an extrinsic thing.
108 When I wear clothes, I am affected by and fitted to them and dependent on them as clothed by them. The mode depends on the clothes as to its origin, and so is not separable from them; if I take off the clothes, the mode ceases to be. Furthermore, in habitus, unlike in ubi, quando, and situs, the extrinsic thing does not measure-that is, provide a standard or rule for judging-the denominated substance, but rather is just simply and "nakedly" applied to the substance.
109
The relation between the clothes and the mode reflects the unique sort of causality involved in the causing of modes. Modes do not require a direct and per se cause; 110 they can come to be indirectly through another event, such as the act of getting dressed. The conditions that occasion the emergence of the mode are said to be the "origin" of the mode. Clothes do not efficiently or formally act on a person to bring about a mode. Rather, the clothes are applied to the person; this application makes a difference of fittingness (convenientia) to the person, and it "leaves behind" (derelinquitur) a mode of fittingness and dependence in the person. For most Scholastic thinkers, a thing fits with itself or with another when the latter is either in accord with the nature of the former, fulfills some potency of the former, or displays the nature of the former in a better manner than if the latter had not come together with the former.
111 Many artifacts fit with human nature when they are physically applied to the human body, not because they directly follow upon human nature, but because they reveal that nature well and because they fulfill a human potency for engaging with the world. When I hold and use an artifact, I am rendered able or better able to do certain things, and my rational nature, with its open-ended range of possible ways of engaging with the world, is revealed and expressed. This relation of fittingness brings about an intrinsic change in the person because it actualizes that range of possibility in a definite way. When I wear clothes or hold a tool, I do not merely take on a new relation of spatial adjacency to that artifact; in addition to these relations, an intrinsic mode of habitus must be posited to explain my relation to artifacts adjacent to me. This is consistent with the fact that many artifacts have an element of conventionality to them: the structure or style of my clothes may be conventional, but the effect they have on me and the potencies they actualize in me are not conventional, but follow upon rational nature.
At this point, a Suárezian might object by distinguishing two kinds of modes. On the one hand, some modes have a per se cause, a cause by which they are drawn out (educere) from the potencies of their subject. For example, the sensible shape of a thing is a mode that is caused to complete the quantitative figure or magnitude of the thing. These modes exert formal causality over their subjects, actualizing and perfecting them. On the other hand, some modes merely "result" from certain conditions, without a direct per se cause; these are not drawn out from the potencies of their subject but merely exist in the subject given certain conditions, and they do not formally cause their subject, or actualize or perfect it. 112 Habitus would seem to be in the latter category-but if that is correct, then habitus cannot actualize a potency in the subject, as it is supposed to do. John's response is to deny an aspect of the distinction. Every mode is drawn out from the potencies of matter, even if it does not have per se causes, as in the case of habitus, and every mode completes, actualizes, and perfects its subject, and so is a formal cause. 113 John bases his realist modal view in part on Aquinas's claim that acts and, through the mediation of acts, subjects are proportioned to their circumstances, such as their place and time, but these extrinsic circumstances leave a property in the act and the subject. Likewise, John reasons that a subject's circumstances, like his clothes, leave a mode in a person through the mediation of his relation to them. Aquinas says that the categories quando and ubi, which result from the circumstances place and time, are both human "conceptions" and "properties of the acts," while the circumstances themselves are both modes of what is done in the acts and outside the acts. But he goes on to say that acts, strictly speaking, do not have accidents, but rather the circumstances are "conditions" of the 112 person acting, through the mediation of acts. This suggests that circumstances can belong to a subject as its modes. 114 In the case of habitus, clothes are not merely external to a subject but also belong to it through a mode.
John's view offers a plausible interpretation of all the relevant texts from Aquinas. Aquinas claimed, in the text from De potentia quoted above, that clothes are not a form but are just spoken of in habitus as if they were a form. 115 John concurs: extrinsic things constituting habitus are not forms inhering in a person. Rather, because of these extrinsic things, modes come to be in the person which ground the extrinsic denominations by which these accidents are named. 116 Even though these accidents are signified as purely extrinsic, not as inhering modes, Aquinas claims that "nothing prevents something from being inhering, which nevertheless is not signified as inhering." 117 In like manner, Bernardus Morisanus argues that, since categorical extrinsic denominations are said intrinsically of their subjects, there must be something intrinsically and absolutely in the subject that accounts for this denomination. 118 So, on the realist modal view, while it is true that Aquinas holds that habitus and the other sex principia are named by extrinsic denominations, nothing in the texts that make those claims contradicts the claim that there is a real mode that underlies those denominations, and indeed other texts indicate that Aquinas also holds that there are such real modes. The extrinsic denomination view and intentional modal view do not take into account all that Aquinas says on this issue.
Furthermore, the realist modal view makes sense of Aquinas's texts on the categories as "modes of being." Aquinas seems to suggest that some modes of being, such as actio and passio, are really reducible to others.
119 But he also seems to say that each categorical mode of being is a real grade of being, having an act of existence and essence. 120 He furthermore says that habitus is a medium and quasi-action between two things, with no indication that he means this in a merely linguistic sense.
121 While some modes of being, like actio and passio, are reducible to some other mode, in the sense that they are referred to one effect external to an agent, each mode of being, including actio and passio, is a distinct real mode in a subject, which grounds distinct modes of predication. For example, the actio of heating and the passio of being heated are both referred to one effect, the heat in the thing being heated, but while the actio refers the agent to this patient, it also involves a real change in the agent, explained by a real mode. Likewise, habitus refers the wearer to the things worn, but still really affects the wearer, which is explained by a real mode; in both cases, the reality of the mode is indicated by the way in which the subject-the agent in the case of actio and the wearer in the case of habitus-is denominated. 122 In this way, Aquinas can be plausibly read as a realist about all the categories.
On the realist modal view, the dependence of the mode on the extrinsic thing explains the relational aspects of habitus without making habitus a categorical relation, a pure respectus, or a respectus extrinsecus adveniens. Explaining this involves another key distinction of John's, the distinction between real relations, or relations according to being (relationes secundum esse), and transcendental relations, or relations according to what is said (relationes secundum dici). A real relation is entirely dependent for its existence on the real existence of its foundation and its term. On John's view, it is a form really 119 different from its foundation and its term, and inheres in the subject of the foundation, and orients it towards another (ad aliud) as toward a pure term. The relation of similarity is a relation in this sense. A transcendental relation is dependent on another (ab alio) as its cause, effect, measure, or as an extrinsically affecting thing, but it does not orient its subject towards another as toward a term, and it is really identical to its subject. For example, prime matter is transcendentally related to the substantial form that actualizes it: it is dependent on that form as formally causing it, but it is not oriented by a real relation over and above its own entity toward that form; rather, to be transcendentally related to or dependent on substantial form is just what it is to be prime matter.
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A mode of habitus is transcendentally related to an extrinsic thing, and so is dependent on that thing but is not a real relation or orientation to it. This transcendental relation is identical to the mode, which is the medium whereby a subject has something outside itself, such as clothes, because the clothes, having been applied to the body, engender this mode of dependence. 124 Some who hold this view, such as Rubio, Goudin, and the Complutenses, call habitus a mode and a respectus, but by respectus they mean a dependence on an extrinsic entity, not an orientation towards that entity, as on the pure respectus view. 125 This view does not deny that we have an orientation towards our clothes, but that this orientation is explained by a real relation, not by a mode of habitus. We must posit that mode to explain the unique sort of dependence and fittingness we have with our clothes, and how wearing clothes causes new completion and actualization in us. Another Suárezian objection might be raised at this point: habitus can be explained as a unity of order. Sometimes things that are extrinsic to one another have the unity of order: they have relations to one another whereby they are, for example, oriented to the same goal, or jointly are in a place, or have a common shape, as with the parts of a house. 126 This is a genuine unity, less than the unity of a being, or the unity of a subject with its accidents, but greater than the unity of an aggregate, like a pile of rocks. 127 The Suárezian could argue that my clothes and I have unity of order: we are different things, but located in the same place, with the same shape and position, and my clothes are ordered to the goal of warming and ornamenting me, while I am ordered to a goal of expressing myself through them. No further being needs to be posited.
A proponent of the realist modal view can respond that wearing clothes causes more in me than that. I "fit" with my clothes, and they actualize my potencies for engaging with the world; this is best explained by a mode that is also a transcendental relation. In this manner, Rubio argues that by nature we are naked and without tools, but, because of our reason, we have a natural aptitude for an accommodation with and joining to clothes and tools; once we are dressed or hold tools, this aptitude is actualized, and this actualization of a natural aptitude or potency must be explained in terms of a new real accident, which is a mode inhering in the person, not an action performed by the person, though it is directed towards facilitating action. 128 Another objection is that if habitus were a mode that some subject can have, then this would contradict Aristotle's claim that, in categorical habitus, the having is not itself had, since that would lead to an infinite regress of havings. Admittedly, this would not necessarily defeat the view, since Aristotle might have been wrong. But the modal realist can respond that although we "have" the mode, we do not have it in a way that would require positing another having between the subject and the mode, because modes immediately inhere in their subjects. "Having" a mode does not match any kind of having listed by Aristotle in any of his texts.
From his examples, it is clear that John follows Aquinas in thinking that this mode arises only as a result of human rational activity, though he thinks that animals can have habitus when they are clothed, and he also includes walls having coverings, such as paintings, in habitus. 129 He does not explain why this category only results from human activity; but, as we have seen, Rubio and Albert do, as do two twentieth-century Thomists, Charles de Koninck and Joseph Owens. De Koninck argues that habitus result from the potentially infinitely open-ended scope of human reason. We need to express and reveal ourselves, and we do so in part through our clothing, which can reveal our feelings, self-understanding, subjectivity, and social roles. 130 Furthermore, much of our experience of the world and of ourselves is mediated through our clothes: I am aware of myself in feeling my clothes around me, and thereby also aware of the world and of my shared materiality with the world. 131 By wearing different sorts of clothes we are completed in different ways: we are by nature incomplete in our external coverings, so that by reason we can adapt ourselves to an open-ended variety of environmental and social conditions. 132 De Koninck does not mention modes, but he seems to have something like them in mind when explaining how habitus completes us. Owens is more explicit in endorsing the modal theory: he says that habitus is in the subject through its dependence on an extrinsic thing. He suggests that this sort of dependence is found even when artifacts are not immediately adjacent to the body and also in relation to other persons in institutions like marriage. 133 These extrinsic things affect a person in a way that limits and actualizes in a determinate way the person's potentially infinitely open-ended range of ways of relating to the world.
Furthermore, the realist modal view is well supported by and makes good sense of Aquinas's account of human reason's relation to material natures. Aquinas discusses this in texts that are similar to the text cited at the beginning of this article. These texts provide further evidential motivation for the realist modal view. When Aquinas discusses human reason's relation to material natures, he compares the infinite effects of human reason to the particular effects of animal nature. 134 Lower animals have instruments and coverings as body parts by nature. Even those extrinsic instruments that animals produce, such as the nests of birds or the insect-gathering sticks of apes, are the result not of reason, but of natural impulse based on cognition of particulars. 135 But the human body is adapted by the rational soul for the expression of the potentially infinite effects of reason, and so the human body shares in reason's open-ended cognitive, appetitive, and productive scope. This is seen in the ability of the hands to fashion any sort of artifact and the ability of the vocal organs to express anything known by reason; reason can use both the human body and artifacts, as its instruments. 136 Furthermore, because of reason, humans affect themselves in ways different from the ways in which lower animals affect themselves. By reason, we can invent artifacts which have as their end the modification of the human body, for the sake of changing how we relate to the world, as when we build houses to protect ourselves. 137 When we invent and use such artifacts, we do not only take on a new spatial relation to them and new actions towards them.
Rather, the open-ended range of ways that we could engage with the world is actualized in a definite way. An artifact confers new "powers" or "habits" on me for efficaciously engaging with the world. Such a selfaffecting is unprecedented among lower material things, and it is plausible to explain it through a new kind of being, a habitus.
The category habitus can be compared to habitus in the category of quality, such as virtues and vices. Just as they cannot produce genuine artifacts, so nonhuman animals cannot have virtue and vices, because reason is required to have these. But lower animals can naturally have bodily dispositions, such as beauty and strength, which are similar to qualitative habitus in that they are tendencies to act in a certain way. Because we have reason, we not only can have these dispositions naturally, but we can form them in ourselves, just as we make artifacts. Our bodies can be formed to obey reason, as when we train our hands to play a musical instrument. And we can train nonhuman animals to have incomplete qualitative habitus, like our virtues or vices. Similarly, we can give them accidents in the category of habitus by putting artifacts, like clothes, on them, for our own purposes. Lower animals, like all material things, can be modified by human reason in ways of which they are not capable by nature. 138 Humans can produce modes of habitus in lower animals (and in inanimate things, as when we put paintings on a wall), for material things have an open-ended range of possibilities for obeying human reason. Reason's activity expands outward into the material world, in order to act more effectively and actualize our possibility for engaging with the world, so that we reach perfection. When we apply one material thing to another for the sake of completing these possibilities, it is plausible to hold that a mode of habitus results in the material thing, just as it is plausible to posit such a mode in myself when I bring an artifact into adjacency with myself. Artifacts complete us and other things in various ways, and this completion is, metaphysically, a mode.
That artifacts intrinsically and really affect us, and so real modes of habitus should be posited, is further seen from Aquinas's claim that the use of artifacts affects our ethical state, as in his discussion of the virtue of modesty, which moderates our use of external things. One can be immoderate in this use either through excessive or deficient use of externals relative to the customs of a place or through inordinate attachment to externals, as when one seeks excessive pleasure through ornamentation in clothing. 139 Much of the virtue of modesty can be explained as part of the virtue of honesty: clothing and other externals signify one's role or state in life and should truthfully represent these things. 140 But this does not explain everything about modesty, which also requires that the externals be fitting (convenientes) to the wearer, since externals can add to the beauty of the human body. 141 Bodily beauty is a disposition (habilitatio) of the body, a proportion among its parts with a perfection of color. 142 We can, through treating the body as an artifact, increase this beauty through applying artifacts to the body, as when one uses jewelry to augment one's beauty; these artifacts supplement and follow upon our natural inclinations. 143 Although artifacts have much about them that is conventional, our inclination to produce them is not, nor is their effect. If the application of artifacts to the body can supplement and affect bodily dispositions, then this application is not something purely extrinsic to the body but something that intrinsically affects the body. We can immodestly desire the increase in beauty that comes from their use; what we immoderately desire is not just the artifacts themselves, but the artifacts as applied to and intrinsically affecting us and our way of comporting ourselves toward the world. This moral difference in modesty is founded on a real metaphysical difference, which is well explained through a mode.
CONCLUSION
Based on all the foregoing, I can now offer a quasi-definition of habitus and an account of its extension. Something is a habitus if and only if it is a really existing mode left in its subject by something extrinsic to the subject, where the extrinsic thing fits with the subject, the subject is dependent on the extrinsic thing, one of the subject's unlimitedly open-ended potencies for rationally engaging with the world is actualized by the extrinsic thing, and the extrinsic thing has been applied to the subject for some humanly rationally guided purpose or use.
Owens is correct, I think, that the range of extrinsic things that constitute such a mode is broader than the clothing and weapons generally mentioned. Any tool that is actively being used actualizes one's potencies for engaging with the world in a definite way and the user is thereby dependent on the tool, and so any tool that is actively being used brings about a mode of habitus. This includes entering a building, using any vehicle or animal for transportation, and using lexical artifacts like written texts. Likewise, John of St. Thomas seems to me correct in saying that any time a human person puts one artifact on another for the sake of ornamenting or otherwise fitting with the latter, a mode of habitus results in the latter. Furthermore, Owens seems right to me in including engagements with other people who are adjacent to one in some way, as when one comes together with another to perform a political action or a sexual act, as constituting a mode of habitus.
A realist understanding of habitus is important for fully understanding human persons and their relation to the world, as well as for understanding the nature of accidents and of categories; merely understanding habitus as a kind of extrinsic denomination is insufficient for understanding these things, and all other view of habitus reduce to these two views. While this category was underexplored by Aristotle, its importance is highlighted by the debates over it in the Scholastic literature. Attentiveness to this topic may give one a deeper taste of the complexities of Scholastic metaphysics, a greater openness to the rich realism of accidents, and an appreciation for the grandeur of the human person expressed in the realist modal view.
